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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MANUEL LAMPON-PAZ, individually  
 and on behalf of *E.D.L.P., a minor, 




DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION; STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 
* (Dismissed as Appellant pursuant to Clerk’s Order entered 9/25/14) 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-05757) 
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 8, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 








                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Manual Lampon-Paz appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 We note, as a threshold matter, that we previously summarily affirmed the District 
Court’s dismissal of a nearly identical action filed by Lampon-Paz in 2012. See Lampon-
Paz v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 532 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2013).  In the second 
action filed in 2013, Lampon-Paz alleged that the federal defendants -- the Departments 
of Justice and Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration -- used 
electronic methods, including electromagnetic waves, ultrasonic messaging, and “brain 
mapping,” against him.  The federal defendants allegedly used these mind-control 
techniques to prevent him from “whistleblowing” on misbehavior by other federal 
employees.  Lampon-Paz did not direct any specific allegations against defendant the 
State of New Jersey.  As a result of the defendants’ conduct, Lampon-Paz allegedly 
suffered an invasion of privacy, causing him to have several cardiac episodes and 
permanent injury to his back, knees and heart, causing harm to his marriage, and causing 
difficulties for his son at school.  Lampon-Paz also alleged violations of various federal 
statutes and regulations in connection with the conspiracy to control and silence him.  
Lampon-Paz demanded money damages and injunctive relief.  The District Court’s 
decision includes a comprehensive summary of the allegations Lampon-Paz brought in 
his numerous filings.   
 The federal defendants and the State of New Jersey moved to dismiss the amended 
complaint with prejudice, and the District Court granted those motions in an order 
entered on January 23, 2014.  In its decision, the District Court contemplated whether it 
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had subject matter jurisdiction over Lampon-Paz’s claims because of their insubstantial 
nature.  Ultimately, however, the Court rested its dismissal on the basis of res judicata 
and Lampon-Paz’s failure to state a plausible claim for relief.  The Court dismissed the 
State of New Jersey pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.  The Court also denied 
Lampon-Paz’s motions to amend his complaint to add other federal and state defendants, 
change venue, appoint counsel, and obtain injunctive relief.    
 Lampon-Paz appeals.1  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over res judicata, or claim preclusion, dismissals.  See Elkadrawy v. 
Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).  We also exercise plenary 
review over a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Heffernan v. Hunter, 
189 F.3d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 We will affirm.  Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies in both 
federal court and New Jersey when there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a 
prior lawsuit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit 
based on the same cause of action.  See Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 
963 (3d Cir. 1991).  “To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation 
attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial 
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”  Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).  Res judicata applies even if a plaintiff attempts to 
present a different legal theory in the second action.  See United States v. Athlone Indus., 
                                              
1 Lampon–Paz sought to represent his minor son, E.D.L.P., on appeal.  The Clerk of this 
Court advised him that he could only represent himself, and that an appearance by 
counsel was required on behalf of his son.  No such appearance was entered and, 
therefore, the appeal was dismissed as to E.D.L.P. 
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Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984).  It “gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if 
a particular issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the earlier 
proceeding.”  CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Bd. of Trustees of Trucking Employees Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 
F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
 The District Court correctly found that all elements necessary for res judicata to 
apply were satisfied, and, therefore, that Lampon-Paz’s second action was barred.  In his 
first action filed in 2012, there was a final judgment on the merits involving the exact 
same parties.  That prior suit was based on the same cause of action as the second action, 
namely allegations that the defendants employed fantastical covert electronic techniques 
to invade his mind and harm him and his family.  The only difference between the first 
and second actions is that the first action also involved an employment-related claim 
against the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).  That difference, however, is 
immaterial in the context of the res judicata analysis.2  In determining whether a 
subsequent case is based on the same cause of action as a prior case, we will look to 
whether there is an “essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various 
legal claims.”  Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173.  Here, as held by the District Court, in both 
the first and second actions, Lampon-Paz alleged that the defendants were covertly 
harming him and his son through invisible electronic means in retaliation for reporting 
                                              
2 The District Court in the first action determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over Lampon-Paz’s case to the extent that he was appealing the decision of the MSPB, 
and we upheld this determination.  Final decisions of the MSPB may only be reviewed by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Lampon-Paz, 532 F. App’x at 
126 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A)). 
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co-workers’ misconduct.  The material facts alleged in the first and second actions are the 
same.  See Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d at 984. 
 Lampon-Paz argues that res judicata would apply only if the defendants had 
stopped their actions, which they have not.  Appellant’s Informal Brief, at 5.  This 
argument is specious.  The issue is not whether the defendants have continued to engage 
in conduct that formed the basis of the first civil action.  The res judicata analysis turns 
on whether there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior lawsuit involving the 
same parties and a subsequent suit involving the same underlying events.  See Lubrizol 
Corp. 929 F.2d at 963; Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d at 984.  Here, Lampon-Paz’s second 
action reasserted the same cause of action against the federal defendants and the State of 
New Jersey that was previously alleged and properly dismissed in his 2012 civil action.   
 We further conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the amended 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the 
claims are implausible.  In order to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  Hence, “only a complaint that 
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  Although Lampon-Paz enumerated various injuries, he did not 
plead “factual content that allowed the District Court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. at 678.  Lampon-Paz’s 
amended complaint alleging brain-mapping, subliminal messaging, and other methods to 
control his mind and harm his body is not “plausible on its face,” as required to survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
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 Furthermore, the District Court properly denied leave to amend because granting 
such leave would have been futile; properly denied injunctive relief because the claims 
were implausible; properly denied a change of venue, where, at the time of the motion, 
Lampon-Paz was a resident of New Jersey, the acts in question all took place in New 
Jersey, and the State of New Jersey was one of the parties; and properly denied 
appointment of counsel because the claims were implausible. 
 In addition, the District Court correctly dismissed the amended complaint as to the 
State of New Jersey on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment and the principles of 
sovereign immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment renders a state immune from suit by 
private parties in federal court unless the state consents to jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The State of New Jersey has not consented to suit in federal court. 
 Last, Lampon-Paz cannot raise new arguments on appeal.  For example, for the 
first time on appeal, he alleges the use of “Neuro Pleural Linguistics or Neuro Linguistic 
Programming” to cause him harm.  Appellant’s Informal Brief, at 13.  He also raises for 
the first time on appeal -- without explanation or analysis -- a Fourth Amendment claim. 
Id. at 22.  We will not review arguments raised for the first time on appeal absent 
exceptional circumstances, Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 
2011), and none are present here. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
Lampon-Paz’s amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  The motions he has filed 
in this Court to “have the Court intercede,” for a restraining order, and to show cause for 
being detained, all are denied.  His motion to amend his reply brief is granted. 
